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PREFACE
At 6:57 a.m. in Missoula, M ontana on Septem ber 11, 2 0 0 1 ,1 awoke to a phone call from
my mother. I remember the exact time because the tone of her voice was so urgent, her
message so horrifying: “Turn on the television, quick. An airplane just hit the W orld
Trade Center.” She was in shock. I scrambled for the remote control. Unable to find it, I
stretched from bed and pressed the power-button with my finger. The image, as so many
have described it, was surreal: New Y ork’s twin towers standing side by side, black
smoke billowing from one. I watched, frozen. Suddenly an object streaked across the
screen and exploded into the other building. “W hat airline?” I screamed. “W hat airline?”
It is a strange question to ask at such a moment, I know. But when your father is
an airline pilot it is the only question after learning of a crash. My father is a captain for
the Delta Shuttle. In a typical day he might fly in and out of New Y ork’s LaGuardia
Airport, across the East River from the W orld Trade Center, four or five times, so for a
few terrifying moments on Sept.l 11 didn’t know where he was or if he was even alive.
Fortunately, I found out later that he was not working at the time but I knew his life
would never be the same.
The World Trade Center was perhaps the most prominent landmark on a pilot’s
flight into New York City. Approaching LaGuardia from Boston’s Logan Airport on a
clear day my dad, said he could see the two towers scraping the sky from 20 miles out.
Then he would turn toward the mouth of the Hudson River, dropping down near the
Statue of Liberty and circling around the W orld Trade Center’s 110-story towers once
before setting his plane down on runway 4. The pattern he flies into New York City since
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Sept. 11 is the same as it was before but now when he lands he always looks down on the
void in lower Manhattan, unable to forget what happened there.
In the weeks after the attacks, I rem ained glued to the 24-hour news networks and
read hundreds of column inches about the airline industry’s violent transformation: U.S.
military fighters patrolled the skies over American cities prepared to shoot down a
hijacked airliner that threatened lives and property on the ground; there was talk of
arming pilots with handguns; and the industry was bleeding millions of dollars a day,
putting the jobs of hundreds of thousands of airline employees in jeopardy. Obviously,
for me, the attacks struck pretty close to home. For a professional project for my M aster’s
degree in journalism I was compelled to write about the sudden change in my father’s
profession.
Originally, I intended to do kind of pop-psychology account of how pilots were
dealing with post-Sept. 11 pressures in a career already known for its high level of stress.
But in a conversation with my father last fall he deflected the story from himself. He said,
“If you want to know how some of D elta’s employees handle pressure, you should talk to
the people who were working at the OCC that day; they did an incredible job.”
The OCC is D elta’s central com m and center. Dad explained that although his
airline had escaped the horrors of United and American on Sept. 11, it still faced a
logistical nightmare. After the second plane hit the south tower D elta’s chief flight
controller shut down the airline, several minutes before the government closed U.S.
airspace nationwide. All of a sudden, flight dispatchers and pilots had to coordinate the
landing o f no fewer than 400 planes carrying at least 30,000 passengers. Some landed in
places as rem ote as Santa M aria in the Azores, stranding passengers and crews; and, after

IV
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the governm ent opened airspace 5 days later. Delta had to restart the massive operations
it had ground to a virtual instant halt. But before the airline could recover a single plane,
engineers and security analysts had to develop new security procedures and technology to
prevent another catastrophe. Clearly the O C C ’s response was vital to the story, but I
knew there was more.
In the weeks following Sept. 11,1 talked to Delta pilots, flight attendants and
engineers to get their reaction to the day that changed their profession forever; and in
M arch I went to D elta’s headquarters in Atlanta for four days to see the OCC and its
support resources function in person. D elta’s experience is part of the larger story of the
aviation industry’s triumphs and mistakes, and it offers a rare glimpse into the minds of
an extraordinary team of professionals— by no means all of them pilots— whose jobs
depend on cool confidence and quick thinking.
M y father’s jo b and my status as a student allowed me a level of access at Delta
that would have otherwise been impossible. W hen a reporter from the Washington Post
or the Wall Street Journal, for example, visits Delta he is accompanied by a public
relations manager I was not. N or did I surrender any editorial privileges. On the contrary,
m ost o f the people I talked to recognized that for better or worse they are part of a new
w orld order, and asked only that I tell their stories fairly.
A journalist’s role as a “w atchdog” for abuses of power in our democracy requires
vigorous skepticism, but another role of journalism is to record the experiences of people
as they cope with change. The instant American Airlines Flight 11 sliced into the W orld
Trade C enter’s north tower at 8:45 a.m. on Sept. 11, one world ended and a new more
dangerous one began, a struggle in which the people of the airline industry are on the

V
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front lines o f and one where life for all Americans will never be the same. W hatever the
airlines’ past failings, the responsibilities of the men and women I observed at
Delta— and of those who do their jobs at every airline— are enormous and they deserve to
have their stories told.

VI
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I. DELTA HEADQUARTERS
Outside the headquarters of Delta A ir Lines Inc., near A tlanta’s Hartsfield International
Airport, almost six months to the day after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, a guard inspected
my father’s and my credentials and looked us up and down. We cleared the first security
perim eter but just a few steps inside another guard asked us to prove we were supposed to
be there. My father is a pilot for Delta and we had come to see Capt. Dan Yates, an old
family friend and a special project manager in the airline’s flight operations department,
to find out how Delta was coping with the aftermath of the attacks. Although I ’d only
been at headquarters a few minutes I ’d begun to appreciate that flying in this country will
never be quite the same.
The headquarters consist of three five-story brick buildings connected by two
pedestrian bridges on the outside and a maze of hallways on the inside. Operation
Control-3 houses multi-million dollar flight simulators capable of challenging a novice
pilot with just about any scenario his instructor can dream up. Operation Control-2 is
filled with classrooms and Hollywood-style airplane sets used to train flight crews for
emergencies in as realistic an environment as possible, right up to the air-sickness bags
stuffed in pretend seat-back pockets. Operation C ontrol-1 is home to the Operation
Control Center (OCC), the cerebrum of the nation’s third largest airline. The OCC is
divided into 17 departments each with a distinct area of expertise but all inextricably
connected. Here, m athematicians, meteorologists, pilots, engineers, economists, flight
dispatchers and security analysts, to name just a few of the positions, determine the safest
and most cost-effective way to operate 2,200 flights to over 500 cities worldwide, 24hours a day, seven days a week.

1
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W hile the long-term effects of Sept. 11 on the country remain largely uncertain,
the attacks have already transformed the airline industry: flights had to be reduced;
cockpit doors were strengthened against attackers trying to get at the controls inside;
airport security was heightened; and the cost of it all has left the future of some airlines
hanging in the balance. With Y ates’ guidance (and his security clearance) I would
observe several key features of D elta’s operations over the next four days— from security
briefings at the Flight Operations department to the floor of the OCC to a ride in a Boeing
767-400 flight simulator— to see how these changes are being felt at Delta. The airline’s
experience is part of the larger story of the industry’s triumphs and mistakes, and it offers
a rare glimpse into the minds of a team now charged with keeping the skies safe.
On the surface, the flight operations department could have been any other office
space in Atlanta: A sea of wall-to-wall carpet filled with cubicles and surrounded by
offices and conference rooms on every side save one left open to let in the Georgia sun.
But the employees at “Flight O ps” are hardly typical. M ost are pilots, many with
advanced degrees in business or engineering and many are also retired military officers
with strong leadership skills and a knack for order. Flight Ops is a liaison between
management and D elta’s 9,800 or so pilots on issues ranging from the operational safety
o f aircraft to contract negotiations. However, since Sept. 11, it has been focused primarily
on security.
When I arrived at Y ates’ half-opened office door, an assistant was inside briefing
him about a forthcom ing meeting with federal air marshals. 1 could hear his calm,
articulate voice: “I ’ll have to move some things around but we need to discuss our
operations at National.” My father met Yates about 10 years ago in Boston when they
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were both flying 727s. He also holds a M aster’s degree in electrical engineering from the
M assachusetts Institute of Technology. After a stint as chief pilot for the Delta Shuttle in
New York City Yates was asked to come to Atlanta as something of a utility infielder for
Flight Ops. He has published numerous articles in D elta’s aviation safety journal Up
Front on issues such as windshear (a violent meteorological phenomena that has resulted
in several comm ercial airline crashes over the years) and jet engine fuel efficiency.
His office is Spartan in appearance. The first thing I noticed was that the
com puter monitor on top of his steel desk was draped with green camouflage netting “just
in case of an air-raid,’’ he said sarcastically. Unopened cardboard boxes were stacked in
comers. On the wall behind his desk were steel cabinets with three die cast model
jetliners on top; and on the wall in front of his desk a dry-erase board sported a quote
from Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar:
Cry Havoc ! And
let loose the dogs of war. That this
foul deed should
smell above the
earth with carrion men
groaning for burial.
-Marc Anthony
Early last Septem ber Yates had put aside his managerial responsibilities to return
to training so he could remain proficient as a pilot even as his career brought him further
away from the cockpit. But after the attacks. Delta pulled the brainy 43-year-old out of
the classroom and put him back in his office. Except for weekend trips to see his wife and
two small children in Duxbury, Mass., he has been living out of a hotel room ever since.
Suddenly, Delta needed one of its best problem solvers to help fix a security system that
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nobody knew was so terribly broken. I ’m jum ping ahead, however, to the world that
began after American Airlines Flight 11 exploded into the W orld Trade Center at
8:45a.m. D elta’s story begins earlier on Sept. 11, inside a hanger at Boston’s Logan
airport.
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II. T H E A T T A C K S
It was a perfect day, 70 degrees and clear blue skies, perfect for a leisurely “ferry” flight
to Cincinnati. Mike James, a D elta 737-800 co-pilot met Capt. Pat O ’Connor at 7:30a.m,
inside a hanger adjacent to L ogan’s international terminal E. After a pre-flight inspection
the two pilots settled into the cockpit and ground crew workers kicked chocks, holding
the plane in place, out from behind its giant wheels. James and O ’Connor were supposed
to have left Boston the day before but a mechanical problem delayed the flight by 24
hours, so they had received a new fight plan to fly the repaired plane, given the flight
num ber 9930, empty of passengers to Cincinnati. At 7:45a.m. O ’Connor maneuvered the
737 into the long line of aircraft forming on taxiways for Logan’s morning departures.
Several planes ahead, on American Airlines Flight 11, M oham ed Atta and four other
passengers in rows 2, 8 and 10— two in pairs and one alone were making final
preparations to hijack the plane shortly after takeoff.
At 7:59a.m. Flight 11, a 767 with 81 passengers and 11 crew, departed runway 9,
clim bing out into an offshore breeze before turning west for Los Angeles. James and
O ’Connor were close behind. They had flown the route dozens of times before and the
two pilots had over 40 years of flying experience between them, but nothing could have
prepared them for what was about to happen. As they clim bed to a cruising altitude of
35,000 feet, over western M assachusetts, James looked down on the Adirondacks and
saw that the leaves were just beginning to change color. It was the kind of morning that
rem inded him of why he became a pilot. But soon a bizarre call from Boston’s control
center would change his mood: Delta 9930, I do n 't know how to tell you this so I ’m ju st
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going to tell you. There’s an American 767 w e ’re not talking to with its transponder shut
ojf. Its last altitude was 29,000feet, and we think its headed right at you.
A transponder sends a radio signal reporting a plane’s altitude, airspeed and
heading to air traffic control. So after Atta, who authorities believe was flying the plane,
turned the transponder off, Flight 11’s exact location was unknown. Moments later near
Albany, N.Y, James saw the silver 767 about 5,000 or 6,000 feet beneath him racing east.
James was probably the first person to see Flight 11 after it was hijacked. He reported its
altitude and heading to Boston Center. At first, James thought the plane may have lost
electrical power and was headed back for an emergency landing. But immediately
O ’Connor knew something more sinister was afoot. He rem inded James that the 767 had
a wind driven generator fan that pops out in case of total electrical failure. Even if the
plane had lost both its engines it still would have had enough power to run the
transponder. James and O ’Connor continued west, listening closely to the radio.
At 8:45a.m. James heard Boston Center erupt into commotion: “You can hear the
background noise at the center on the radio. After Flight 11 hit the W orld Trade Center I
could hear yelling and screaming every time a controller keyed his mike.” Controllers
announced that a plane had flown into the W orld Trade Center and put aircraft near New
York City in a holding pattern. “I thought, my God, I bet it was that American 767,”
James said. Fifteen m inutes later United Flight 175 ripped into the south tower.
Immediately after the second plane hit, Joe Turner, D elta’s chief flight dispatcher,
gave the order to shut down the airline. Several minutes later, the government grounded
all civil aircraft nationwide. Initially there was no way to know if Delta had lost a plane
or if more attacks were planned on flights already in progress. T urner’s order sent D elta’s
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flight dispatchers into action, scanning their screens to account for every single Delta
plane and then to land it quickly, wherever it happened to be. At that time in the morning
Delta had more planes aloft than any other airline— some 400 aircraft carrying no fewer
than 30,000 passengers scattered in the skies around the world.
O ’Connor and Jam es were ordered to continue to Cincinnati, full throttle. But
when O ’Connor began to slow the plane for landing, about 20 miles from the airport, the
flaps wouldn’t budge. The 737-400 is equipped with a device that prevents one flap from
lowering farther than the other. So if both flaps aren’t working precisely, pilots have to
configure the plane for a special emergency landing. James pulled out a quick-reference
guide and immediately flipped to the section covering asymmetrical flap landings.
Cincinnati’s air traffic control noticed 9930 was a little slow on its approach, and fearing
the worst, asked James to confirm that he was not being hijacked. “It took a little
convincing on my part but I explained that we had a flap problem and would be landing
shortly,’’ James said.
Flap asymmetry is pretty rare. Most pilots only practice for the problem in a
simulator, but James had just returned from training and the procedure was still fresh in
his mind. He quickly ran through the emergency checklist for O ’Connor, who landed the
plane safely at 10:11a.m. James and O ’Connor were fortunate to get a place at one of the
airport’s gates, which were quickly filling up with the dozens of unscheduled flights
landing in Cincinnati. Still reeling from what had just happened, James and O ’Connor
walked through the airport to the crew lounge, where a television was on. They watched
the W orld Trade Center’s two towers crumble to the ground.
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Hundreds of other Delta flights headed west from the East Coast also made
impromptu landings in places like Cleveland and D es Moines. At first Delta Flight 1989,
a 767 departing Boston for Los Angeles at approximately 8 a.m., came under particular
scrutiny from law enforcem ent because it closely resembled two of the hijacked planes.
(American Airlines Flight 11 and United Airlines Flight 175 were both 767s departing
Boston for Los Angeles at around 8:00 a.m.) But Flight 1989 landed safely in Cleveland
at approximately 9:50a.m. No evidence has been found to suggest terrorists were on
board or that any attacks were planned on the flight.
W ith U.S. airspace closed, dozens more Delta aircraft bound from Europe that
were east o f 30 degrees latitude returned to the continent; aircraft west of 30 degrees
latitude continued on to the Azores, Bermuda and the Canadian Maritimes. Delta landed
all o f its planes on Sept. 11 without any major incidents, but for Yates and many at the
airline, the hard w ork was just beginning. “In many ways getting our planes down was
the easy part,” Yates said. “Far more complicated was getting them back in the air.”
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III. NEW THREATS
The terrorist attacks had made it clear that the industry’s old strategy for dealing with
terrorists was obsolete. W hile the FA A ’s pre-Sept. 11 “common strategy” for hijackings
rem ains classified, it is clear pilots were instructed to cooperate with hijackers to avoid an
incident that could result in damage to flight control or injury to passengers. It was
assum ed that a terrorist would allow the aircraft to be landed where he would make
demands and law enforcem ent could take over— a tragic misconception that will haunt
many in the industry for the rest of their lives.’
By the afternoon of Sept. 11 Yates had assembled a security task force to address
the new threats. The task force attacked the problem on two fronts: a procedural group,
responsible for developing new strategies and communicating the information to flight
crews, and a technical group, responsible for investigating structural modifications of
aircraft. On Sept 12, Yates and the procedural team made up of pilots, flight attendants,
engineers and security experts worked almost 24 hours nonstop drafting a memorandum
that outlined new procedures needed before a single plane could again rise to the sky.
W ith its passengers and crews stranded at airports around the world, and the company
bleeding millions of dollars a day, Delta couldn’t wait to act.
The memo addressed many new security procedures that would make national
headlines in the weeks to follow: security access at airports; verification of employee
credentials; restricted access to the cockpit during flight; and air defense maneuvers that

'It is incon ceivab le to the em ployees I spoke to that the pilots o f the hijacked planes w illin gly allow ed the
terrorists to get behind the controls. In cell phone calls from U nited Flight 93 (the hijacked plane that
crashed in a Pennsylvania farm field) passengers reported seein g their pilots' bodies lying in the aisle,
lifeless. O ne pilot said the terrorists probably knew a com m ercial airline pilot w ould only surrender a
plane’s controls over his dead body. The new procedure is also classified but it is safe to say never again
w ill flight crew s acquiesce to a hijacker’s dem ands.
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could be used by pilots to subdue a hijacker. However, Flight Ops still needed to get the
new procedures to flight crews, some of who were staying at private homes in places
D elta normally doesn’t even fly to. The terrorist attacks made reaching their pilots in
secrecy a paramount concern. “W e didn’t want to send our brand new security strategy to
a public fax machine in a general aviation terminal or hotel lobby, ” Yates said. When
possible, Yates sent the m em o to secure control rooms at airports, but keeping it secret in
remote locations required more ingenuity.
In Gander, Newfoundland, for example, Yates enlisted the help of the Royal
Canadian M ounted police to deliver the memo. Delta set down 26 trans-Atlantic jets at
Gander’s airport that usually only sees a handful of flights per day. On Sept. 11 its
taxiways were crammed with aircraft sitting wing-to-wing, filled with thousands of weary
passengers. The small fishing community simply did not have the infrastructure to handle
thousands of visitors. Accommodations was needed by passengers and crew, customs
officials were needed to process hundreds of foreign nationals and law enforcement was
needed to address the possibility that so-called sleeper terrorists were on board some of
the flights.
Law enforcement and customs officials were brought in from other parts of
Canada and the United States to assist with the legal situation. And the people of Gander
opened their homes and public buildings to the stranded travelers for five days. Some of
the captains took on the roles of leaders and ambassadors, staying in contact by radio and
cell phone with the OCC and disseminating information to Canadian officials and
passengers as it became available. The generosity shown by the people of Gander “stood
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in sharp contrast to the inhumanity of the terrorist attacks that had brought so many to
their shores,” Yates remarked.
Capt. Michael Quiello, a calm, meticulous man headed the technical group
created after the attacks. On the morning of Sept. 11 the form er A-6 Intruder flyer in the
M arine Corps was in his office when his son called from W ashington, D C., to ask him
what he thought was going on at the W orld Trade Center. His son is a congressional aide
on Capitol Hill and in the middle of their conversation American Airlines Flight 77 hit
the Pentagon at 9:40a.m. Im mediately, the Capitol building was evacuated and Quiello
didn’t talk to his son again until later that afternoon. But the pilot had to put his concerns
as a father aside for the time being because suddenly every single cockpit door in the
nation was obsolete.
As soon as reports that terrorists had burst into cockpits on the hijacked flights
emerged, Quiello began designing a strengthened cockpit door. The work involved in
retrofitting an aircraft with even the smallest part, he well knew, would be extensive. One
problem was that there simply is not enough real estate in a modem cockpit to make
significant alterations. Another problem was that the new door would still have to allow
pilots to escape in the event of a crash. But the most serious obstacle involved the
complex issue of cabin pressurization.
A commercial airliner gradually pressurizes its fuselage as it climbs, so at high
altitudes passengers and crew can breathe comfortably in the thin air; valves release
pressure as the plane descends. At 37,000 feet above sea level the atmospheric pressure
inside a standard airliner is kept approximately equal to the pressure at 6,300 feet above
sea level or 8.6 pounds per square inch. W hile this air pressure is perfectly comfortable
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for passengers and crew to breathe, held inside a sealed tube soaring at the fringes o f the
troposphere, it creates the potential for a rapid decompression accident.
In the weeks after Sept. 11 it was not widely reported that airliners’ old cabin
doors were designed to be frangible for a good reason. If a cockpit sealed with an airtight
door were to experience a cracked windscreen, the force of the greater air pressure in the
cabin equalizing with the suddenly lower air pressure in the cockpit could cause a violent
decompression.
An incident aboard a British Airways B A C -111 out of Birmingham, England, in
1990 well illustrates the danger. Shortly after take-off the plane’s windscreen— later
discovered to have been fastened with the wrong bolts by mechanics two days
earlier— shook loose and fell away. The explosive rush of air sucked the captain out from
under his seatbelt, but a flight attendant in the cockpit was able to grab and hold onto his
legs, eventually pulling him back inside. The co-pilot, who was fully restrained at the
time of the decompression, landed the plane safely in Southhampton, England.
Remarkably, the captain suffered only frostbite and a few broken bones.
The new cockpit door would thus have to simultaneously keep intruders intent on
crashing the plane out while letting air pass without difficulty between the cabin and
flight deck. After the governm ent opened U.S. airspace, five days after the attacks,
Quiello led a team of Delta engineers and test pilots to a meeting at the Boeing aircraft
manufacturing company near Seattle. During the flight they feverishly scribbled ideas for
a stronger cockpit door into notebooks to share with federal aviation officials, major
airline representatives and manufacturers.
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I looked at a binder filled with some of the designs generated at the Boeing
meeting. One placed a Kevlar cargo net in front of the cockpit— allowing air to flow
effortlessly while preventing unauthorized entry. Another zigzagged steel wire across the
opening to the flight deck, but both designs left pilots susceptible if a terrorist somehow
sm uggled a firearm on board and both required tremendous time and money to install on
the nation’s entire commercial fleet.
The Boeing meeting settled on a simple device that, in retrospect, probably should
have been present all along: a steel security bar that could be installed on pre-existing
cockpit doors. The engineers were concerned the bar might interfere with cabin air trying
to equalize with air in the cockpit, so they performed a risk analysis. In the previous 50
years o f comm ercial aviation, they discovered, only two aircraft had been lost to a
decompression accident.^ Compared with the sobering number of planes lost in the
previous week— four— to forced cockpit entries the engineers reasoned a greater risk
existed with an unlocked cockpit door. W ith the nation’s entire commercial fleet sitting
idle at airports around the world and the airlines losing millions of dollars a day the FAA
approved the cockpit security bar as a temporary fix.
Currently Delta is designing, in conjunction with the industry and government
agencies like NASA, a permanent cockpit door capable of resisting a hijacker determined
to get at the controls while still remaining permeable to air. Quiello said aeronautical
engineers are uniquely detail oriented and have been concerned with every imaginable

"Since the 1950s there have been about 5 0 rapid decom pression incidents on com m ercial airliners, tw o
resulted in the lo ss o f the aircraft: On March 3, 1974, 347 passengers w ere killed when a Turkish D C -10
crashed after an ex p lo siv e decom pression severed control cables; and on August 12, 1985 5 2 0 passengers
w ere killed after a pressure bulkhead failed on a Japan Air L ines 7 47, the worst single aviation accident in
history. In 1989 an electrical short caused the forward cargo to open on a United A irlines 7 4 7 en route from
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particular of the design: “If you ask an engineer to design a secure cockpit door he’ll say,
‘Okay, how many Newtons does the door need to resist?’ And, ‘W hat are we designing
against, a blunt object, ballistics or battering?’ If you say a blunt object, he’ll say, ‘What
about ballistics?’ And, if you say okay we want to protect against ballistics, he’ll ask,
‘W hat kind of gun, at what range and at what caliber?” The deadline for installation set
by the FAA is April 2003.
Additionally, Quiello headed a study by the Air Transport Association that
investigated the use of rapid turns, descent and depressurization as a way for pilots to
subdue a hijacker. After experimenting with test aircraft and in simulators the AT A
advised that the techniques only be used with extreme caution. Tests showed performing
the defensive maneuvers improperly could result in structural failure and loss of control.
They also warned they could potentially injure passengers trying to prevent a hijacker
from reaching the pilots.
Another strategy, currently being debated in Congress, is whether or not to arm
pilots in order to defend cockpits. United Airlines recently trained its pilots in the use of
“stun-guns” and the A ir Line Pilots Association, the union that represents D elta’s
aviators, came out in favor of arming pilots with lethal weapons after appropriate training
and certification. Delta has yet to take a corporate position, but Quiello expressed
concern about introducing firearms to “a gun free environm ent.” He noted that the gunsin-the-cockpit issue is “overwhelmed with em otion.” And that “we [the industry] need to
think long and hard before putting deadly force in the hands of a pilot.” A pilot in favor
of the move said “If the U.S. Air Force is prepared to shoot down a jet full of passengers

H onolulu to Sydney, nine passengers were sucked out and lost at sea but som ehow the pilots m anaged to
land safely.
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to prevent another plane from flying into a building it doesn’t seem so drastic, to me, to
first give pilots a chance to protect their passengers and them selves.”
The job of a commercial airline pilots changed dramatically on Sept. 11.
Overnight, the planes they love to fly became potential targets for terrorists planning to
use them as guided missiles. Quiello said that pilots spend their lives preparing for the
unexpected and the new threats will be taken in stride. But I wanted to see for m yself so
Yates arranged for me to observe a flight simulator lesson in a 767-400, one of D elta’s
m ost sophisticated airframes.
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IV. THE VIEW FROM THE COCKPIT
The flight simulator is the backbone of D elta’s training regimen. The company owns 30
simulators representing each type of aircraft in its fleet and they run around the clock.’
The newest simulators cost $5 million each and require a special team of mechanics and
com puter engineers to be on call 24-hours a day in case one breaks. But they allow Delta
to train pilots with a frequency and in kinds of situations that would be too costly or
dangerous in a real plane.
I met two instructors and one student co-pilot for a pre-flight briefing in one of
the small rooms adjacent to the eight 767 and 757 simulators in OC-3. The co-pilot was
training for his transition from the 767 “Classic” to the “Dash 400,” a bigger and more
sophisticated version of its predecessor. One of the instructors was there to play the role
of captain in the sim ulator or “box,” as the initiated call it. Capt. M ark Bradley was there
to assess the co-pilot’s performance. The co-pilot looked a little nervous, but Bradley had
the confident strut of a naval aviator that I had come to recognize growing up around my
father and his friends. And, when I looked down at his left hand, I saw the big gold ring
worn by Naval Academy graduates.
Training is the central feature of a commercial airline pilots’ career. Young
aviators must have attained at least 2,500 flight hours (7-10 years experience) in a branch
of m ilitary aviation or at a sm aller carrier before even being considered for a job at a
m ajor airline like Delta. Pilots are selected based on their experience, airmanship and
leadership skills. If a pilot lasts D elta’s extensive interview process he must then undergo
a six-week initial training program in Atlanta. Then he will return at least once a year for
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a week o f recurrent training and on average, once every three years for another six-week
program as he advances in aircraft sophistication and rank. On any given day about 400
Delta pilots will be participating in classroom, sim ulator and “line-operating experience”
training, when a certified captain assesses a pilot during a flight with passengers.**
Bradley began a PowerPoint presentation outlining one of the day’s lessons:
“Non-Normal Landings.” A non-normal or emergency landing is something pilots
rehearse over and over, until it becomes second nature. This is because an emergency
landing may be the most critical moment of a pilot’s career. If a plane loses an engine at
takeoff, for example, the pilot flying has only fractions of a second to react.^ The 767400 blasts down a runway with more than 30,000 pounds of combined thrust from its two
engines. When it attains a speed of approximately 150mph (what pilots call V -I speed or
“the point o f no return”) its wings begin to lift off the ground. At this point there is not
enough runway left to abort the takeoff and the aircraft is thus committed to the sky.
Immediately, the pilot must compensate for 15,000 pounds of thrust imbalance by
steering the giant rudder on the plane’s tail with foot pedals and maintain airspeed by
holding up the throttle for the one remaining engine. Simultaneously, he begins to recite

^ D elta ’s fleet consists o f about 6 0 0 aircraft, representing 12 different airframes: the B oeing 777, 7 6 7 -4 0 0 ,
7 6 7 -3 0 0 , 7 6 7 -2 0 0 , 7 5 7 , 7 3 7 -8 0 0 , 7 3 7 -3 0 0 , 7 3 7 -2 0 0 and 7 2 7 -200, and M cD onnell D ou glas’ M D -I I , M D 
BS and M D -90.
*' L ine operating checks occur every tw o years. D elta’s pilot training and standards department consists o f
148 program instructors like Bradley, 14 crew resource m anagem ent instructors and 45 0 line-operating
check pilots.
^ If the captain is not fly in g during an engine failure at take-off, the traditional cockpit hierarchy is
abandoned because there is no tim e to allow the more experienced pilot to take over the controls from the
first officer. Therefore, all captains and first officers must be equally proficient in engine failure and
em ergency landing procedures and instruction manuals describe the flight crew, in this situation, as either
“the pilot flyin g ” or “the pilot not fly in g .”
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an emergency landing procedure that he has m emorized.'’ Bradley said at moments like
these a pilot’s training must become instinct to avoid disaster.
First, the pilot flying climbs to 400 feet to buy one or two seconds while telling
the pilot not flying to “shut down auto-throttles,” “notify tower” and to “start the
auxiliary pow er unit.” Then he continues to climb to 1000 feet where he re-configures his
instruments and maneuvers the plane for immediate landing. Most modem commercial
aircraft only have two engines so if one fails it’s serious business, and every pilot
understands his career depends on how effectively he executes a V-1 engine failure
procedure in the simulator. The student pilot is assessed on how quickly and accurately
he maintains the appropriate altitude, airspeed and heading. Even slight variations from
the strict parameters means a failing grade and that he will have to repeat the exercise
again and again, until he gets it right.
After the briefing, we walked outside the room to a balcony that overlooked the
plane we w ould be “flying.” The simulator, a square white box about the size of a large
passenger van, stood a story tall on top of four hydraulic arms that sway back and forth
and move up and down mimicking the motion of flight, making the box look something
like the lunar Lander.
Bradley lowered a steel gangplank to the cockpit door and we all filed in. The
captain sat down in the left seat, the co-pilot in the right and they both put on radio
headsets. Bradley sat at a small desk behind the co-pilot with a touch screen com puter on

^Bradley said that, in an em ergency, checklist d iscipline is the m ost important elem ent o f good airmanship.
I learned this lesson as a young driver. W hen m y father taught m e to drive he insisted that I run through a
safety procedure before leaving the drivew ay, checking fuel and oil levels, seatbelt security and the tires'
air pressure. In Septem ber o f 1998 he warned m e that the rear tire o f m y jeep was low on air. but in a hurry
I ignored the safety checklist and drove off. I aw oke from a com a a w eek later to discover that the low tire
caused me to spin out o f control and roll at least three tim es on Route I South in M assachusetts.
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top that controlled the simulator. I sat in a chair to the left of the instructor’s position. In
almost every way the sim ulator’s cockpit is identical to a real one. The controls are the
same, the instruments are the same, even the seats adjust in the same way. The
windscreen is a liquid crystal display, the material used in laptop computers and it wraps
around the front of the cockpit on three sides for optimal realism.
Bradley entered data into his computer for the lesson. We would take-off from
runway 15 Right at Boston’s Logan Airport and climb to 19,000 feet where we would
divert back to Logan for an emergency landing on runway 4 Right. At this early stage in
the student’s training, Bradley was letting him get used to flying the simulator before he
threw anything too intense at him.
All of a sudden the scene at L ogan’s Terminal C appeared. The tarmac, the gate
and the fuel trucks were covered with early morning light and looked identical to the ones
actually used at Logan. Bradley called the pilots on his microphone as though he were an
air traffic controller with a Boston accent: “Deltah Flight Numbah One you’re ready for
push-back. Thanks for pahkin in Bahston.” The cockpit rocked a little when the co-pilot
started to back up. He taxied the plane to a sign that read 15R, pointed us down the
runway and waited for the okay from the controller. “Deltah Numbah One you are
cleared for takeoff; have a nice flight,” Bradley said. I slid back in my seat when the
student pushed up the throttles, blasting us down the runway.
The sim ulator’s software uses highly detailed information, gathered by special
m apping satellites, to recreate the little cracks, bumps and dips on every runway in
D elta’s system. In fact, the sound and motion as we roared down 15 Right was so real I
had to clutch onto the arm of my seat. Then, the vibrations slowed and finally stopped
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when the plane lifted off the ground, climbing in a high arch over Boston Harbor. The co
pilot retracted the landing gear and banked the plane north toward Marblehead, Mass.
W hen we reached our cruising altitude Bradley began to fiddle with his computer to show
me what the simulator could do. W ith the push of a button he turned dawn to dusk and
said he could simulate “a bird flying into the windscreen, an engine fire and all types of
weather, just about anything.”
After a few minutes of practicing steep turns high above the North Shore of
M assachusetts, the co-pilot called air traffic control to announce that he had an engine
warning light and needed to land as soon as possible. A list of the nearest suitable
diversion airports, their distance and the estim ated amount of fuel required to get there
popped up on a computer screen between the captain and co-pilot: Providence, R.I.,
Hartford, Conn., Portsmouth, N.H., Portland, Maine as well as Boston. He entered the
appropriate data for Logan on a keypad and turned the plane around. We quickly made
our way south at 350mph descending about 4,000 feet every minute. Soon Boston’s
skyline and airport came into view.
As we closed in on the runway a pleasant female voice announced the plane’s
altitude from a speaker in the cockpit every ten feet:”60 feet, 50 feet, 40 feet, 30 feet...”
Now the co-pilot intuited his heading and closing speed, making fine adjustments with
the yoke and throttles, 4R painted at the front of the approach side of the runway growing
below us. Then his training became entirely instinct and in the final seconds he gently
raised the nose, landing 1000 feet down 4 Right and we roared to a stop. Perfect.
At the beginning of the 2002 Delta introduced a new element to its pilot
simulator-training syllabus: they are now asked to respond to a bomb-scare during a
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practice flight. Pilots are graded on how quickly they get from 35,000 feet to the safety of
a runway. “W e can never totally simulate reality— the fear, the pressure— but we try to
make our training as close to reality as possible so pilots are as ready as they can be for
the unexpected,” Bradley said. But preparing for the unexpected at a major airline, as I
would discover, requires yet another group of highly trained professionals, who toil
almost perfectly invisible to the passengers they guide in the skies above and help land
safely on every com er o f the earth.
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V. THE VIEW FROM THE GROUND
The bustling floor of the OCC has aptly been described as a cross between N A SA ’s
mission control and the floor of the New York Stock Exchange. “O f D elta’s 10,000 type
A personalities, 9800 are pilots and the other 200 work in here,” said Hank Echols,
D elta’s unflappable director of flight control, as we stepped out onto the floor.
The facility was dimly lit by the glow of hundreds of computer monitors and
seven movie theatre-style screens: two of the screens were broadcasting the W eather
Channel, one had on CNN, another the FOX news network and the remaining three
displayed D elta’s vital statistics for the day— mechanical, weather and safety concerns
and the number of flights on time, delayed and cancelled. At the rear of the floor. D elta’s
17 on-duty aviation meteorologists were busy scribbling on poster-size maps, forecasting
weather for nearly every region of the globe. And, adjacent to the meteorology
department is Atlanta Radio, D elta’s central communications system. Through the use of
satellite technology and strategically placed VHP transmitters, Atlanta Radio can talk to
pilots anywhere on earth.
The philosophy behind the OCC is to have decision-makers from each of the
com pany’s departments and the most advanced aviation support technology together in
the same room.^ The facility was com pleted in 1995 at a cost of $30 million and requires
additional millions annually to keep running around the clock. But it is an investment that
has paid D elta back in spades, mostly because the OCC helps the airline efficiently
handle weather delays.

The operation control center consists o f 130 positions, 23 business processes, 18 software applications
and 17 distinct departments: Flight Control; M eteorology; R adio; Air L ogistics; Crew Tracking; Aircraft
Routing; Airport Custom er Service; R eservations; Flight Operations; In-flight Coordination; Material
’’
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Storms cost Delta money, a lot of money. Every time a weather event cripples a
m ajor airport the repercussions can be felt throughout the airlines’ entire system. If, for
example, B oston’s Logan Airport is closed because of a surprise winter storm off the
M assachusetts coast, air-traffic gets jam m ed up and down the eastern seaboard. All of a
sudden planes flying into Logan have to divert to other airports or circle at high altitude
until it is safe to land. Flights that were supposed to connect in Boston to other cities are
now stuck on the ground or in the air as far away as Atlanta and beyond. This means the
airline loses money on je t fuel,® revenue, hotel rooms for passengers and crews even on
the phone-cards it provides to stranded customers. By having flight dispatchers,
meteorologists, economists and so on together in the same room Delta can predict storms,
move planes around and make necessary cancellations in one fell swoop. The savings
after the OCC handled its first m ajor storm; approximately $30 million. The center paid
for itself in 48 hours.
The central players at the OCC are flight dispatchers. “At Delta we call flight
dispatchers flight superintendents because, frankly, we expect a little more out of them
than your average dispatcher,” said Echols who speaks with ill-concealed affection for
his employees. The airline maintains a staff of 191 flight superintendents who perform a
wide range of tasks that are critical to the safety of thousands of flights every day. During
peak operating hours, a superintendent might be responsible for as many as 50 aircraft.

Services; System Reroute; M aintenance C oordination Center; Structural Engineering; N avigation Data
Base; R evenue M anagem ent; and Corporate Security.
^Aircraft fu el is D elta ’s second biggest operating exp en se after em p loyee salaries. The cost o f fuel is
dramatic b ecause o f the enorm ous econom ies o f scale involved: At a presumed cost o f $1.00 per gallon and
assum ing 2 ,2 0 0 flight segm ents per day, conserving just one gallon o f fuel per flight segm ent translates into
$ 8 0 3 ,0 0 0 in savings annually.
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They make certain planes have enough reserve fuel,^ they forward changes in weather,
wind and airport conditions to pilots and they ensure flights operate in compliance with a
laundry list o f company and federal regulations.
In the early days of the aviation industry, before the advent of the flight
dispatcher, flying was a precarious activity at best. Pilots would take off from dirt
airstrips carrying mail, passengers and cargo on little more than a wing and a prayer. Few
pilots used flight plans, little if any weather information was available and if conditions
changed en route it was up to the pilot to improvise, which often meant setting his plane
down in a rem ote field. M any pilots took off never to be heard from again. A. Scott Berg,
Charles Lindberg’s biographer, writes of Lindberg’s perilous beginnings as an airmail
carrier in St. Louis;
N avigation w as rudimentary at best, w ith pilots relying on visual contact with the ground— follow in g
railroad tracks, rivers or at night, the g lo w o f the tow n below . ‘During the summer months m ost o f our
route w as covered during daylight,’ Lindberg w ould write, but as winter approached the hours o f
night fly in g increased until darkness set in a few hours after w e left St. L ouis.’ D eH avilland planes had
neither landing lights nor navigation lights. ‘Our total lighting equipm ent,’ Lindberg remembered,
‘con sisted o f a pocket flashlight (pilot furnished) and a com pass light attached to a button on the end o f
the stick .’ Lindberg later recounted how he ‘arranged with the mail truck driver to hang four kerosene
lanterns on fen ce posts on the leeward side o f the co w pasture w e used as an airmail field at
Springfield, as a precaution; and I o n ce had to return and land by the light o f the tw o o f them that were
still burning.’ A s a rule, Lindberg recalled, ‘W e w ent as far as w e could, and if the visibility becam e
too bad w e landed and entrained the m ail.’

As the industry continued to grow so too did its accidents. Eventually, Congress
grew tired o f the increasing loss of life, equipment and cargo and passed the Civil

^Since the co st o f fuel for jets varies regionally, just as gas does for autom obiles, airlines save m oney by
purchasing fuel at airports where it is least exp en sive. D elta has a software program that calculates the cost
o f b uying cheaper fuel at one airport and carrying it to an airport where fuel is more expensive. If it is
cheaper to transport the fuel (it costs fuel to carry fuel because o f its w eight) then the dispatcher w ill take
on extra fuel at airports with bargain prices.
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Aeronautics Act in 1938. The act established a system of checks and balances which
sought to make flying safer; and one of its key features was the creation of a new licensed
profession: the aircraft dispatcher. Today, the government requires all U.S. airlines
operating planes with more than nine seats to maintain flight control centers staffed by
FAA accredited dispatchers around the world. By federal law, every time a passenger
plane takes to the skies both the captain in its cockpit and a dispatcher on the ground
share equal responsibility for the safe completion of the flight. Delta has built on this
foundation.
W hen my tour of the OCC was snaking past scores of flight superintendent
positions spread across the floor, I heard a sound that had been noticeably absent since
my arrival at headquarters: a wom an’s voice. Frances Queenan, one of D elta’s most
experienced flight superintendents, noticed me as I walked by with my tape recorder and
asked if I would like to listen in on a conference call with the nation’s 24 air traffic
control centers.
Not to be confused with flight dispatchers, air traffic controllers are a dedicated
team of 15,000 federal employees who manage the flow of aircraft through a vast
network of glassed-in towers, radar installations and control centers. Tower controllers
give pilots taxiing and takeoff instructions and are responsible for planes inside a 30-mile
radius o f an airport. Outside the tow er’s airspace, terminal radar approach controllers
(TRACON) direct planes until they climb through 18,000 feet where control centers, or
what Queenan called “fiefdoms” pick up the aircraft.
Every two hours at quarter past the hour controllers update each other on weather
changes, security issues and the general condition of the nation’s airports. I picked up a
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phone at the position adjacent to Q ueenan's and listened to each of the country’s centers
give its region’s status. The reports m oved fast one after the other except for Chicago. A
w inter storm had passed through the central-M idwest the night before, closing O ’Hare
A irport’s runway 22 so flights in Chicago were getting a little backed up. But blue skies
prevailed over most of the rest of the country and operations were running smoothly. “On
a busy weather day you can be on that call for 45 minutes, but it was short and sweet
today because of the fact there isn’t much going on,” Queenan said. My tour continued
but I asked Queenan if I could come back the next day to watch her work. She agreed.
Queenan grew up in a New York City home filled with talk of planes and radios.
“Aviation to me is not just something I do for a living; it’s something I ’ve lived my entire
life,” she said. Her father was a pilot for American Overseas A ir Lines beginning in
1947. In those days aviation was largely the province of young daredevils without wives
or children, so when Queenan s dad started a family he moved from the cockpit to the
control tow er where he worked until Pan American Airways bought out ADA in 1952.
He then joined the airline’s management, and helped consolidate Pan American’s
international divisions into one of the world largest corporations. The 1950s were boom
years for the airline and Q ueenan’s father often brought home aviators to discuss the
burgeoning industry.
Queenan tells the story of the Friday afternoon she came home from school to
find Charles Lindberg eating tuna and noodle casserole at her kitchen table. Lindberg was
a pathfinder for Pan American in the early 1950s as it expanded into unexplored
territories around the world and later joined the airline’s board of directors. That night
Lindberg came to discuss developments in radio communications with Queenan’s dad.
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but after dinner he sat her on his knee and quizzed the schoolgirl about geography. “You
think you’re an airline brat,” Queenan told me. “I ’m a bigger airline brat.”
O f D elta’s 191 flight superintendents only 11 are women, but even in a world
dom inated by type A personalities and testosterone Q ueenan’s air of confidence and
extensive experience commands respect. She followed in her father’s footsteps,
beginning her career at Pan American in 1967 and climbed the com pany’s ranks. “1 was a
crew scheduler, an aircraft scheduler, 1 boarded airplanes, 1 worked system operation
control, 1 ordered parts, you name it, 1 did it at Pan Am.” Eventually, Queenan earned her
dispatcher’s license and worked in flight control until D elta bought out the company in
1991.
The average dispatcher at Delta proved him self with 15 years of supervising
experience at the company or another major airline (United or American) before even
being considered for flight superintendent training. A 200-hour dispatcher’s program
covering all aspects of aviation from meteorology to radio communications at a selective
aeronautical school followed. And only after passing a grueling exam, administered by
the FAA, were they awarded their coveted airm an’s certificate. Then they are required to
pass written and oral proficiency examinations at least six times annually. At Delta, a
dispatcher’s recurrent training is spread out over the calendar and includes a ride in a
plane’s cockpit to give them first-hand knowledge of life on the other side of their radio.
Additionally, dispatchers are responsible for learning the frequent advances in
aviation technology, safety and security procedures discussed at workshops and
published by the government and in professional journals every m onth.’'*On a moment’s

In M ay the Aircraft D ispatchers Federation w ill hold a workshop discussing the peculiar problem
volcanic ash poses to aircraft safety. Som etim es when a volcano erupts it sends an enormous cloud o f fine
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notice, FAA officials have been known to drop in on a dispatcher to administer a popquiz and have the authority to pull his license on the spot. Not surprisingly, dispatchers
are well compensated for their efforts and at the major airlines earn salaries up to
$150,000.
Q ueenan's position near the front of the floor reflects her extensive experience.
As the Atlanta sector m anager she was responsible for the most critical hub in the Delta
system. Virtually every one of the airlines’ flights has either a direct or indirect
connection to Atlanta so if planes get backed up in Atlanta Delta gets backed up
everywhere.
Her workspace consisted of three monitors and a touch-screen computer
displaying a mind-boggling amount of data. In addition to the Atlanta sector she was
responsible for D elta’s fleet of aging 727s, about 50 aircraft in all. One monitor had a
digital map of her region filled with dozens of little gray dots, each representing a Delta
plane in real time. The other screens listed weather conditions, her planes’ arrival and
departure times, the altitude airspeed, heading and remaining fuel of the aircraft aloft,
how much fuel was needed for the planes yet to depart, all her planes’ mechanical
information and service history, and how many more hours their crews were permitted to
fly under FAA and contractual guidelines. Flight superintendents communicate updated
information to pilots via Atlanta Radio, which is channeled through their position phone.
They can also use the Autom ated Communication and Report System (ACARS), a coded
message typed into their keyboard then transmitted to a plane’s onboard computer.

dust into the atm osphere. A nd, if the ash is sucked into a hot je t engine, it can m elt and then re-harden on
the turbine’s blades. In 1985 a British A irw ays 747 flew into the invisible plum e blow n from M ount
G alunggung at 3 7 ,0 0 0 feet over the P acific O cean, stalling all four engines. In a remarkable display o f
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A fter the terrorist attacks a flight superintendent’s job became even more
complicated. When I arrived at Q ueenan’s position for the second time her phone was
buzzing urgently and an orange light was flashing on top of her desk. Because it can get
so hectic on the floor, superintendents need a way to know with a measure of certainty
when they have an important phone call. “OCC, Frances Queenan,” she answered.
The call was from a reservations agent in Birmingham, Ala., who was desperately
trying to reschedule a group of passengers through National Reagan Airport in
W ashington, D C. But because the airport’s flight paths are only seconds away from so
many government buildings the airport operates under strict FAA guidelines: every flight
in and out of National-Reagan has two or more sky marshals— armed federal agents
trained in close-quarters marksmanship— on board; passengers on National flights are not
permitted to stand up at the beginning or end portions of the trip; and W ashington’s
airspace is closely regulated and patrolled by military fighters around the clock.
“W e simply can’t do that,” Queenan told the agent. “No, since Sept. 11 we are
only allowed to operate into W ashington-Reagan to and from certain locations for
security reasons. I ’m sorry, the FAA is not going to change that rule for a group of 38 or
39 or however many this is.” And that was that.
Although no one ever imagined a catastrophe of such magnitude was possible,
Delta was not entirely unprepared for Sept. 11, in part because all of the resources at the
com pany’s disposal were right there in the OCC. Indeed, from a logistical point of view,
Sept. 11 was in many ways was like the unpredictable weather events the facility was
designed for, only much bigger and more intense.

airmanship the pilots were able to re-start an engine after plum m eting 2 5 ,0 0 0 feet and landed safely in
Jakarta, Indonesia.
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Suddenly the airline’s operating system, which thrives on forecasting as many
variables as possible— weather, mechanical problems and cost— was faced with the
unpredictable. Planes, passengers and crews were stranded at the wrong airports,
connecting flights were disrupted, accommodations were needed, critical information had
to be relayed to pilots and financial losses began to mount almost immediately.
Employees said the atmosphere inside the OCC after the second plane hit the
W orld Trade Center was indescribable. ' I don’t know if words are capable of capturing
the feeling here that day,” said Frank Crowell, a pilot with the Flight Ops department
who drove to work right after the attacks. Like so many Americans, Crowell had watched
United Flight 175 slice into the south tower on television at 9:06a.m." Not only did I
think that it might have been a Delta plane, I thought there was a good chance I just
watched someone I knew well die.” he said. The workers at the OCC had little time for
emotion as they scanned their screens to account for every Delta plane and then to land
them immediately.
Crowell, who has a special understanding of both the OCC and a cockpit,
explained that the emergency landing of even a single flight is no small matter. Pilots and
dispatchers have to choose from a list of diversion airports and have to make
sophisticated calculations comparing aircraft weight to runway length. Unscheduled
landings in the middle of a flight are particularly challenging for a pilot because he must
contend with thousands of tons of unbum ed fuel. He can either dump it, delaying the
landing or touch down “heavy” requiring more runway length to stop and a complete
structural inspection before the plane is put back into service.
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At the time o f the attacks, hundreds of Delta planes, loaded with jet fuel for long
flights to Salt Lake City and the W est Coast, were barely an hour into their journeys; and
many other flights over the Atlantic were running low on fuel after the previous night’s
passage. Flight superintendents had to work fast and the OCC provided the perfect
platform to do it.
Critical information about every airport in the world was available at their
fingertips as well the technology to communicate with flight crews. When possible, flight
superintendents directed pilots to on-line airports— which had been meticulously
inspected by Delta’s own engineers and were equipped with support equipment. Turner
D elta’s chief flight dispatcher who retired after Sept. 11, decided to inform pilots of the
attacks after they landed so they could focus on getting their planes down safely, a
judgm ent call that would later spur the criticism of many pilots.
A fter a Washington Post article (“The View from the Ground: D elta’s Reaction to
Sept. 11 Illustrates the Airline Industry’s Violent Change Dec. 30, 2001) implied Turner
was “worried about potential panic in the cockpit,” the OCC was bombarded with heated
calls and letters from pilots who felt they were kept in the dark about the catastrophic
security breach. Flight superintendents insisted the quote was taken out of context and
that they merely wanted to limit the tasks of pilots to an already complex list of
procedures during emergency landings. W hile most pilots said knowledge of the attacks
was precisely the kind of information they needed in order to land safely that day.
W hoever is right, the small controversy illustrates what happens when the trust between a
pilot and dispatcher is called into question, on either side of the radio.
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By 12:00a.m, pilots, dispatchers and air traffic control had coordinated the safe
landing o f D elta’s entire fleet— all but two at on-line airports— a logistical feat unequaled
in the history of aviation. But later that afternoon, when Queenan began her shift, the
OCC was still buzzing. She was immediately bombarded with frantic calls, even as she
noted that for the first time in her career her screens were blank, with no civil aircraft
aloft. She spent the afternoon answering questions from family and co-workers trying to
get information about the safety of D elta’s planes, reservations agents who needed
updates for bewildered passengers and from pilots, some stranded in places like Gander,
who needed to know when it was safe to come home. All the while she was fearing for
the lives of close childhood friends in New York City, one of whom she later discovered
was o f the firemen killed at the W orld Trade Center.
From the morning of Sept. 11 until D elta’s last aircraft was recovered from the
Canadian Maritimes five days later nearly 1,000 employees m anned Flight Ops and the
OCC. Flight superintendent’s spent the next three weeks re positioning Delta’s aircraft,
scheduling in-service inspections for the hundreds of jets that landed heavy on Sept. 11,
implementing new security procedures and bringing balance back to the airline’s
operating system. “Dispatchers are selected because they think well inside the box but
also because, when they have to, they do just as good a job thinking outside the box,’’
Queenan said.
After the attacks, new technology and training were put in place at the OCC. A
position for a corporate security representative was added to coordinate the many security
regulations handed down by the company and the newly created Transportation Safety
Administration. Also, the flight control director runs frequent drills to rehearse for an
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emergency response; and new software allows flight superintendents to simultaneously
send an emergency message on ACARS to every Delta cockpit. On Sept. 11,
superintendents had to type out a code specific to each aircraft separately.
None of the employees I spoke to at Delta have any illusions that their company
did something special to avoid a hijacking on Sept. 11. It may have simply been chance
that a Delta airliner w asn’t attacked. It may have been that the terrorists felt Delta, a name
that the reflects the airline’s origins as a crop dusting outfit on the Mississippi Delta,
didn’t pack the same symbolic punch as United or American. But like the industry
leaders. Delta is left trying to close the security holes that led to the Sept. 11 attacks.
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VI. THE WEAKEST LINK: AIRPORT SECURITY
Logistically a fail-safe security system is probably impossible. The airlines spent the past
few years attracting customers with cheap tickets and improved traveling convenience. A
new security procedure that adds thirty seconds to the screening time of every passenger
would delay the boarding of a full 767-400 by nearly three hours. Reforms that
overwhelm the already overstressed air travel system would drive passengers away by the
millions. And Israeli terrorism expert Ariel Merari reminds us, in the recent book
“Aviation Terrorism and Security,” airport security can only go so far:
T he security system w as caught by surprise w hen an airliner was first hijacked for political extortion; it
w as unprepared w hen an airliner w as attacked on the tarmac by a terrorist team firing automatic
w eapons; w hen terrorists, w ho arrived as passengers collected their luggage from the conveyer belt,
took out w eapons from their suitcases, and strafed the crow ed in the arrivals hall; when a parcel bomb
sent by m ail exp lod ed in an airliner’s cargo hold m id-flight; when a bom b was brought on board by an
unw itting p a ssen g er...T h e history o f attacks on aviation is the chronicle o f a cat-and-m ouse game,
where the cat is busy b locking old holes and the m ouse alw ays succeeds in finding new ones.

And no whole was bigger than the one the terrorists found on Sept. 11.
First, they well understood the weakness of security checkpoint screening. Before
the attacks, airport screening nationwide was contracted to private companies with poorly
trained and paid workers. It was later revealed, however, that nine of the 19 hijackers on
Sept. 11 were brought back for additional inspection before being finally being allowed
to board planes with small knives and box-cutters hidden in their hand luggage. So the
problem was not just a lack of expertise, but the difficulty of detecting something small
weapons. Even under close scrutiny an X-ray picture of a knife blade turned edge-side
forward looks like a thin line and a box-cutter—jum bled together with pens, pencils,
rulers and calculators— seems similarly innocuous.
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Second, the terrorists knew if they got weapons through security there was
another loophole— in the psychology of passengers and crew. They gambled that
passengers would think their plane was being hijacked for money or political ransom.
They may have also known that in hijacking situations pilots had been instructed by the
FAA to cooperate with the attackers in order to get their plane on the ground as soon as
possible, where law enforcement can negotiate. Only the Sept. 11 terrorists had no
intention of bargaining for money, political ransom or anything else.
Cockpit voice recordings and cell phone calls from the hijacked planes illustrate
the calculated nature of the attacks. On some of the flights terrorists rushed the cockpits,
probably overcoming pilots by knocking them unconscious or slitting their throats. On
other flights, terrorists lured the cockpit door open by savagely cutting flight attendants
and passengers in the cabin then they attacked the cockpit. On all of the flights a group of
terrorists played crowd control, herding passengers to the rear of the planes to prevent
them from assisting the crew.
Passengers on United Flight 175 and American Airlines Flights 11 and 77,
although terrified probably thought they would eventually land and be released. After the
passengers on United Flight 93 learned that the three planes had flown into the W orld
Trade Center and Pentagon on cell phone calls they rushed the terrorists. Flight 93
crashed in Shanks ville, Pennsylvania at 10:37a.m, short of its intended target, which very
well may have been the W hite House. Flight 93 marked a turning point in the psychology
of Am erican aviation: never again will flight crews and passengers acquiesce to
hijackers, now that they know their own lives and the lives of thousands on the ground
may be at stake. T hat’s why tragedy was avoided several months after Sept. 11 when the
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so-called shoe-bom ber Richard Reid tried to light explosives on a trans-Atlantic flight
and was subdued by a flight attendant and several passengers. But we are still left with
the challenge of screening m illions of passengers and pieces of luggage every day for
weapons and explosives.
After Sept. 11 the government created the Transportation Safety Administration
to handle airport security with a 60,000-strong force of well trained and paid federal
employees. The airlines are now also required to “match” every bag put in the belly of a
plane with a passenger on board, eliminating the possibility a terrorist will check a bag
full o f explosives and make a run for it. Additionally, bomb-sniffing dogs and machines
scour luggage, passengers and airports for explosives.
The airlines also have in place a system that efficiently determines the risk posed
by passengers. W hen a ticket is purchased the CAPPS— Computer-Assisted Passenger
Prescreening System— assesses the customer on a variety of criteria. The exact
information used is classified but probably includes the passenger’s address, credit and
travel history, whether the ticket was paid for in cash, if it is one way, if the passenger is
traveling alone and so on. A recent review by the Department of Justice acknowledged
that the approximately 50 pieces of data used by CAPPS do not discriminate on the bases
of ethnicity. A 50-year-old stockbroker from New York City, for example, who has
traveled on my fathers’ shuttle flight from LaGuardia to National-Reagan twice a week
for the past decade will breeze through security. But a few passengers deemed high-risk
will have their bags exam ined again and may be asked to undergo individual screening.
A nd there is another effective strategy used by the airlines today that most
passengers will never see but provides an important defense against an attack— sudden
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changes in security levels, procedures and routines that respond to information about
heightened threats gathered by intelligence services and deny a would-be hijacker a
measure o f certainty.
Can the airlines close the holes that led to the Sept. 11 attack? Historically, the
industry has done a very good job preventing mechanical and weather related accidents.
It is also very good at training individuals to execute those procedures under the most
stressful situations imaginable. T hat’s why the odds of being involved in a fatal aviation
at an airline with a safety record like Delta are around 1 in 12.4 million. It is clear that the
new training and technology has made airport security better today than ever before. But
screening hundreds of thousands of bags and passengers every day places enormous
psychological demands on the airport security system. The success security operators
have in preventing another tragedy thus may rely on something more difficult to
implement than better technology and training.
Before I left the OCC to board a Delta 767-400 to Salt Lake City on my way
home I asked Queenan how she performs so well under pressure day after day without
cracking. She credited success in her profession to the attitude of flight superintendents,
one we often trust in but rarely see and that allows ordinary people do extraordinary
things: “W hat is it those astronauts sa id .. .Yes, that’s it. In this business failure is not an
option.” Aviation was founded by that attitude. And, after Sept. 11, it can advance only
by that attitude.
Such an attitude does come from security workshops or sophisticated computer
systems. It is not handed down by the federal government or bolstered by new uniforms
and bigger paychecks. It comes from a commitment that is socially established over
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lifetimes of experience and challenges— a commitment to excellence and order that is
handed down to young people by older people whom they respect and trust. It might be
by that measure of character, rather than economics or technology, through which we
make our skies safe again.
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SOURCES
Because this is meant as a magazine piece, not a newspaper or scholarly article, I
have avoided using citations and mentioning, in the body of the text, some of the names
of the people I have interviewed or the books and articles I have read and relied on for
my information. I owe them all many thanks. Additionally, I am confident I was able to
reconstruct an accurate chronology of the events of Sept. 11, as they unfolded at Delta, by
interviewing employees from many of the com pany’s departments who were working
independently of each other that day and by pulling up the com pany’s records of flights.
Interviews also allowed me to cross-reference accounts for inaccuracies, and many
articles from m ajor news outlets allowed me another way of verifying exact times and
facts. So many people so generously gave of their time and knowledge to help me with
this project it is hard to believe there would be any mistakes, if there are, they have been
furnished exclusively by me.
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Jon Agne, a Delta co-pilot who flew into LaGuardia minutes before Flight 11 hit the first
tower on Sept. 11; M ark Bradley, a 767 instructor for Delta; Capt. Ken Crocker, my
father and a 737-800 captain for Delta; Frank Crowell, OCC Duty Pilot; Hank Echols,
D elta’s director of flight Control; Jerry Elder, OCC sector manager; Capt. Craig
Gottschang, D elta’s director of pilot training and standards department; Carlos
Fernandez, Delta flight operations manager; Mike James, a Delta co-pilot who saw
American Airlines Flight 11 on Sept. 11; Dave Oden, flight operations manager of
domestic operations; Bill Palmer, flight superintendent for Delta Shuttle operations;
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